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Challenges for
Pacific Command

China's North Korea Policy:
Rethink or Recharge?
Andrew Scobell and Mark Cozad
Abstract: There has been much speculation lately about a Chinese
“rethink” on North Korea. Beijing has clearly been exasperated with
Pyongyang. What is going on with Beijing’s Pyongyang policy? Has
there actually been a reassessment of the PRC’s policy toward the
DPRK? Is there a military component to this policy, and what do
we know about planning by China’s People’s Liberation Army for a
Korea contingency? This article answers those questions.

T

here has been much speculation lately about a Chinese “rethink”
on North Korea.1 Certainly, Beijing’s exasperation with Pyongyang
has been palpable. The degree of debate evident in the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) over its policy toward the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) in recent years is unprecedented and comes
on the heels of a series of particularly provocative acts by Pyongyang.2
Since 2006 these acts include a series of missile tests and nuclear tests
each conducted apparently without prior notification or consultation
with Beijing. Additionally, strains in bilateral relations were triggered by
provocations such as the torpedoing of a Republic of Korea (ROK)
Navy corvette, the Cheonan, and the shelling of Yeongpyong Island in
2010. Further strains in Beijing-Pyongyang ties followed the death of
Kim Jong Il in December 2011, and the elevation of his son Kim Jong
Un to the position of DPRK supreme leader. Perhaps the most recent
provocation from the PRC perspective was the execution of Kim Jong
Un’s uncle, Jang Sung Taek, in December 2013. Jang appears to have
been China’s key interlocutor with the current North Korean administration and his death came as a great shock to Beijing. Moreover, it raised
new questions about Pyongyang’s policy direction and introduced new
uncertainties into the DPRK’s relationship with the PRC.3
China, of course, experienced its own leadership transition at the
18th Party Congress in November 2012 and the National People’s
Congress in March 2013 with the appointment of a new generation of
leaders. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary and PRC
President Xi Jinping, while maintaining general continuity with the policies of his predecessor Hu Jintao, has sought to put his own imprimatur
on the affairs of state, espousing a “China Dream” and proposing a
“new type of great power relationship with the United States.” Do these
changes include a revamped North Korea policy?
1     The research and writing of this article was made possible by funding from the Tang Institute
for U.S.-China Relations.
2     See, for example, Paul Letters, “Beijing Rethinks Its North Korea Policy Priorities,” South China
Morning Post, April 11, 2013; David Mulrooney, “China’s Changing Calculus on North Korea,” Asia
Times Online, April 29, 2013, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/KOR-01-290413.html.
3     Andrew Scobell, “A Death in the Family,” U.S. News and World Report, January 21, 2014.
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Chinese officials appear to be changing the term they use to label
the bloody struggle waged on the Korean Peninsula six decades ago.
During Vice President Li Yuanchao’s visit to North Korea in July 2013
to commemorate the crucible of the China-North Korea alliance, Li
purposely used the simple phrase “Korean War” rather than the title
that has been used for five decades, the “War to Resist America and Aid
Korea.” 4 This semantic change may be as much about a public relations
effort to improve relations with the United States as it is about signaling a change in the PRC’s perceptions of Pyongyang or policy toward
North Korea. Beijing appears eager not to antagonize the United States
unnecessarily. But China may also intend to signal to North Korea not
to take its longtime ally for granted.
In any event, a high level of frustration with North Korea endures
and this has manifested itself in a remarkable public airing of anger
and outrage by Chinese scholars, analysts, and members of the public.
One episode in May 2012 triggered a particularly vitriolic reaction from
Chinese “netizens”: the kidnapping of twenty-eight Chinese fishermen by North Korean naval vessels. The story unleashed a torrent of
anti-DPRK sentiment becoming “one of the hottest trending topics in
China’s microblogging sites.”5 Although these open displays of deep disaffection with North Korea are genuine, they do not appear to signify a
policy shift by Beijing toward Pyongyang.
Indeed, the public airing of ire about China’s North Korea problem
has yet to translate into a sea change in Beijing’s policy towards
Pyongyang. Much speculation about Chinese thinking on North Korea
is discerned from interviews and conversations with Chinese civilian
and military analysts and academics, including Track II dialogues.6
However, more concrete evidence is not easy to obtain.
What is going on with Beijing’s Pyongyang policy? What are China’s
goals where North Korea is concerned? Has there actually been a reassessment of the PRC’s policy toward the DPRK? Is there a military
component to this policy, and what we do we know about planning by
the China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for a Korea contingency?
We contend that Beijing conducted a thorough policy reassessment
toward North Korea a decade ago when faced with the 2002-03 nuclear
crisis and China has since redoubled its efforts and pursued a course
consistent with previous policy.7 Beijing’s reassessment reaffirmed that
critical Chinese interests and goals vis-à-vis North Korea remained
unchanged. An examination of the full scope of initiatives China has
4     Xu Fangqing and Yu Xiaodong, “North Korea: The New Normal,” News China, October
2013, http://www.newschinamag.com/magazine/the-new-normal; “Kim Jong Un Meets with Vice
President Li Yuanchao,” PRC Foreign Ministry Press Release, July 26, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
eng/zxxx/t1062374.shtml.
5     Keith B. Richburg, “Chinese Public Vents Fury at North Korea Over Seizure of Boats,” The
Washington Post, May 24, 2012, 8.
6     See, for example, Bonnie Glaser, Scott Snyder, and John Park, Keeping an Eye on an Unruly
Neighbor: Chinese Views of Economic Reform and Stability in North Korea (Washington, DC: Center for
Strategic & International Studies/United States Institute of Peace, January 3, 2008); and International
Crisis Group, Shades of Red: China’s Debate over North Korea (Asia Report No. 179, November 2, 2009).
7     This is the consensus of a number of respected analysts, but perhaps the best evidence that
such a decision was made is the concerted array of initiatives launched by Beijing since that time
described by the authors. See, for example, Andrew Scobell, “The View from China,” in Asia at
a Tipping Point: Korea, the Rise of China, and the Impact of Leadership Transitions, ed. Gilbert Rozman
(Washington, DC: Korea Economic Institute, 2012), 69-81.
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pursued since the early 2000s underscores the extreme seriousness with
which Beijing views the Pyongyang situation and highlights the extensive array of resources Chinese leaders allocated to address it. Below
we provide context, outline the policy, and then identify the array of
components in China’s recharged policy initiative with particular attention to military preparation and planning.

Beijing’s Greatest Challenge

Perhaps no foreign policy issue poses a greater challenge for China
in the 21st century than North Korea.8 Relationships with the United
States and Japan have each proved to be major tests for China but arguably neither has provided the sustained policy challenge to the same
extent as North Korea. The DPRK has proved to be a near constant
headache for the PRC since the early 1990s. Unlike relations across the
Taiwan Strait with Taipei, which have ameliorated appreciably since
2008, and relations with Washington and Tokyo, the climate of which
has tended to fluctuate considerably over time, Beijing’s Pyongyang
problem has not abated and appears to be chronic.9 China’s unruly
neighbor has conducted a series of nuclear tests (October 2006, May
2009, and February 2012) and missile launches (notably July 2006, July
2009, April 2012, and May 2013). Pyongyang’s provocations include, the
two aforementioned incidents in 2010 (which killed a total of 48 ROK
military personnel and 2 civilians), a declaration that Pyongyang would
no longer abide by the 1953 armistice agreement and the severing of its
hotline to Seoul (March 2013), and blocking South Korean access to
Kaesong Industrial Zone (April 2013). For the PRC there has been no
respite where the DPRK is concerned.
Like a variety of foreign policy issues in recent years, North Korea
threatens to besmirch China’s prestige. Beijing has been accused of
consorting with unsavory regimes around the world. For example, in
the lead up to the 2008 Olympics, China found itself tarred as the bad
guy in a humanitarian tragedy in Darfur because of Beijing’s association with a Khartoum regime accused of perpetrating atrocities. China
craves the reputation of a responsible global citizen and a force for good
in the world.10 However, Pyongyang is not akin to Khartoum in Beijing’s
eyes. After all, North Korea is not some far off Third World state like
Sudan. Rather, it is a radioactive Darfur on the doorstep—a humanitarian disaster and the subject of enormous international attention with
a repressive, distasteful dictatorship made all the more complicated
because North Korea is a hyper-militarized state armed with ballistic
missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Instability immediately across the Yalu River directly threatens domestic stability in
China’s heartland because of the specter of many hundreds of thousands

8     Scobell, “The View from China,” 79.
9     Ibid.
10     See, for example, Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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of refugees flooding into Northeast China. As a result, Beijing is ultrasensitive to any hint of turmoil on the Korean Peninsula.11

Go Big and Go Strong

China, the available evidence suggests, has not undertaken a serious
reexamination of its relationship with North Korea in recent months or
years. Rather, Beijing’s rethink on Pyongyang appears to have happened
much earlier—a decade ago. While the public debate has been—and
continues to be—contentious, senior Chinese leaders remain unshaken
over the basic thrust and contours of this policy.
Officially, China pursues a policy of peace, stability, and denuclearization. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Hong Lei told
assembled reporters on 8 April 2013 that China remained focused on
“unremitting efforts to safeguard peace and stability on the peninsula,”
and China seeks to “push forward the denuclearization process.”12 While
Beijing is undoubtedly sincere about desiring a non-nuclear Korean
Peninsula, the reality is that denuclearization is a much lower priority
than maintaining peace and stability on China’s doorstep.
Indeed, the Chinese public discourse on North Korea of recent
years appears to be the manifestation of more relaxed censorship rather
than any indicator of policy change. And Beijing’s earlier reassessment
on Pyongyang did not result in a decision to abandon its most truculent
and troublesome neighbor. On the contrary, the reassessment concluded
that the PRC had no choice but to redouble its efforts to bolster its
DPRK buffer. In short, ten years ago, China decided that North Korea
could not be allowed to fail. The decision has meant Beijing has decided
to go big and go strong in an all-embracing approach toward Pyongyang
to strengthen the regime on its doorstep. This initiative includes diplomatic, economic, and security dimensions.
Diplomacy. During the past ten years, North Korea has received two
types of diplomatic support from Beijing. First, the PRC has not publicly
condemned the DPRK (although there have been some mild tongue
lashings) and Beijing has watered down United Nations Security Council
resolutions. Second, China has established a multilateral forum with six
participants—North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and
the United States—to manage the North Korea nuclear issue. In 2003,
China launched the Six Party Talks and since then has toiled doggedly to
keep them alive. While the talks have been on hiatus since 2007, Beijing
has worked tirelessly to resuscitate the dormant multilateral forum and
prevent it from collapsing completely. Efforts are currently underway
to reconvene a session in the near future. In May 2013, senior North
Korean leader Vice Marshal Choe Ryong Hae visited Beijing in what
appeared to be an effort to improve China-North Korea relations and
signal Pyongyang’s readiness to curb its bad behavior. The following
11     Chinese leaders are most alarmed by the prospect of domestic instability. Beijing also worries
about upheaval at its borders which threatens to spill over into China. See Andrew J. Nathan and
Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 3-7 (on
Beijing’s perspectives on security vulnerabilities) and 126-137 (on China’s strategy on the Korean
Peninsula).
12     Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference on April 9, 2013,” http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/
s2510/t1030030.shtml.
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month, DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Guan—Pyongyang’s
point man on the Six Party Talks—traveled to Beijing apparently to
signal North Korea’s willingness to reengage in the multilateral forum.
A Chinese initiative to restart the Six Party Talks was clearly underway
with a visit by PRC Vice President Li Yuanchao to Pyongyang in July and
a follow-up trip by Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei—Beijing’s point
man on the Six Party Talks—to the DPRK in August.
Economic. In the early 2000s, China launched a comprehensive effort
to bolster North Korea’s economic fundamentals. Repeated attempts to
convince the late Kim Jong Il of the benefits of Pyongyang implementing
a “reform and opening” policy during his seven visits to China (between
May 2000 and May 2011) came to naught. Nevertheless, Beijing has
undertaken concerted endeavors to get North Korea’s economy off life
support and revitalize a range of economic sectors through a substantial
injection of trade, aid, and investment. But China’s frustration at its lack
of success in persuading Pyongyang to adopt Chinese-style economic
reforms did not deter Beijing.
China has been North Korea’s top trading partner since the collapse
of the Soviet Union. The Soviet demise ended the significant subsidies
from Moscow and triggered a systemic crisis and economic tailspin in
North Korea. During the 1990s, China accounted for approximately
a quarter of North Korea’s total trade, but China’s percentage rose to
one third by 2003 and climbed even higher thereafter.13 Today, China
accounts for well over half of North Korea’s two-way trade. In both
decades North Korea has run a huge trade deficit, and Chinese exports
to North Korea have risen at a more rapid rate than North Korea’s
exports to China. North Korea’s exports have been overwhelmingly
resources such as minerals and marine life.14 Of course these are only
South Korean estimates because actual data is unavailable and smuggling and barter trade along the border is difficult to quantify.
Since the early 2000s, Chinese firms—mainly from neighboring Jilin
and Liaoning provinces have invested in North Korea infrastructure,
agriculture, mining, and retail sectors. Many of these investments have
been encouraged and insured by provincial and national authorities. This
trend represents a significant shift from China’s previous focus on solely
providing economic assistance. Beijing recognized that Pyongyang will
almost certainly never repay loans and that outright aid offers limited
leverage and negligible return. Investing in North Korea allows China
to benefit from economic opportunities—albeit risky ones. Between
2003 and 2009, Chinese companies reportedly invested a total of US
$98.3 million. This sum is much less than Chinese entrepreneurs invest
in other countries on China’s periphery, such as Mongolia, Myanmar,
and Vietnam, but it still makes China the second largest investor in
North Korea. While South Korea may qualify as the top investor, these
funds are solely located in the troubled Kaesong Industrial Complex. In
contrast, investments by Chinese companies are spread across North
Korea in a range of sectors albeit mostly in extractive (41 percent) and
13     Scott Snyder, China’s Rise and the Two Koreas: Politics, Economics, Security (Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner, 2009), Table 5.2, 112.
14     Balázs Szalontai and Changyong Choi, “China’s Controversial Role in North Korea’s
Economic Transformation: The Dilemmas of Dependency,” Asian Survey 53, no. 2 (March/April
2013): 269-291.
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light industry (38 percent) according to one study.15 China continues
to channel investment into North Korea: in August 2012, for example,
Beijing announced the establishment of a fund worth almost US $500
million for Chinese investments south of the Yalu.16
Beijing, moreover, has also provided hundreds of millions of US
dollars in foreign aid much of it in the form of food grains and petroleum.
The size of these shipments increased considerably in 2003, 2004, and
2005 according to available estimates. This aid is reportedly the largest
amount China disseminates to any country in the world and is allocated
at the highest echelons in Beijing rather than through the normal channels for dispersing development aid in the Ministry of Commerce.17
Military. China has not disowned or distanced itself from North
Korea in the security sphere. The PRC’s only formal military alliance is
with the DPRK, the “Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual
Assistance between the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea” signed in July 1961. The document commits
one country to come to the aid of the other if attacked.18 However,
there does not appear to be any real defense coordination mechanism
nor do the terms of the treaty ever seem to have been invoked. While
Chinese leaders have on multiple occasions stated publicly and privately
that Pyongyang cannot assume that Beijing will come to the rescue, the
treaty can provide the justification for an intervention if Chinese leaders
consider such a step to be necessary. Thus, the security relationship is
perhaps best viewed as a “virtual alliance” with considerable ambiguity
as to if and when it might be invoked by Beijing.19
The alliance may be a virtual one but this does not mean that Beijing
does not take it seriously or that the PLA doesn’t see it as real. For Chinese
civilian and military leaders, this alliance remains relevant and personal.
The alliance was sealed in blood during the early 1950s when the socalled Chinese People’s Volunteers fought side by side with the Korean
People’s Army (KPA). Hundreds of thousands of Chinese soldiers gave
their lives in the conflict, and Chinese troops remained in North Korea
until 1958.20 The fact that, despite the sacrifice of blood and treasure
by Beijing many decades ago, Pyongyang continues to absorb China’s
attention, consume Chinese resources, and remain a focal point for PLA
contingency planning (see below)—including the prospect of a second
military intervention—is galling to China’s leaders. But all this pushes
Beijing to redouble its efforts. Indeed, it is clear the PLA is increasingly
concerned about the prospect of instability on China’s periphery and on
the Korean Peninsula in particular.
15     For analysis of the investment switch, see Jaewoo Choo, “Mirroring North Korea’s Growing
Economic Dependence on China: Political Ramification,” Asian Survey 48, no. 2 (March/April 2008):
364. For details and analysis of the investments themselves, see Drew Thompson, Silent Partners:
Chinese Joint Ventures in North Korea (Washington, DC: U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, 2011).
16     Jeremy Page, “China Builds Up Its Links to North Korea,” The Wall Street Journal, June 7,
2012, 8.
17     Snyder, China’s Rise, 113-117.
18     The text of the treaty can be found in Peking Review 4, no. 28 (1961): 5.
19     Andrew Scobell, China and North Korea: From Comrades-in-Arms to Allies at Arm’s Length (Carlisle
Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2004), 19-20.
20     See, for example, Zhang Aiping, chief compiler, Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun [China’s People’s
Liberation Army] vol. 1 (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1994), 137. According to this
authoritative source, the CPV suffered more than 360,000 combat casualties (including 130,000
wounded), as well as “380,000 noncombat casualties.”
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Power Projection . . . around the Periphery

What is unmistakably implicit in the PLA’s warfighting scenarios
and campaign planning is that if conflict occurs it is expected to flare
up close to home.21 What PLA doctrinal writings call “local wars in
conditions of informatization” are anticipated at or just beyond China’s
borders. Of course, China’s armed forces have limited power projection capabilities and it is still unusual for air, naval, or ground units
to deploy or be employed out of area. When units do venture farther
afield—outside of China’s immediate neighborhood or the Asia-Pacific
region—the events are marked with great fanfare. The participation of
Chinese forces in United Nations peacekeeping missions around the
globe (since 1990) and the anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden
(since 2008) are cases in point. But a careful examination of recent
PLA official publications and exercises reveals a focus on mastering the
relatively modest capability to project power within China from one
military region to another.22
Indeed, Chinese leaders appear to think of national security in terms
of four concentric circles: the first is a domestic ring, the second consists
of a ring proximate to Chinese territory, the third ring is more expansive
encompassing China’s wider Asia-Pacific neighborhood, and the fourth
ring encompasses the rest of the globe.23 The first two rings are most
delicate and tend to consume the majority of CCP leaders’ time. The first
ring equates to internal security—the territory that Beijing currently
administers or claims sovereignty over. Thus, this ring includes not just
the restive, sparsely populated western regions of Tibet and Xinjiang
but also the densely populated ethnic Han heartland of eastern China,
and frontier areas along the border with North Korea which includes an
ethnic Korean minority population of more than two million. Beijing
is most sensitive in this first ring because it contains its core national
security interests.24 Since at least the mid-2000s, the PLA has worked
with local and provincial authorities in frontier areas of the Shenyang
Military Region (which encompasses Jilin, Heilongjiang, and Liaoning
Provinces) on so-called “border defense building” activities including
involved efforts to establish close ties between local communities and
military units stationed nearby.25 The goal is to develop a stable, layered,
and tightly organized system of border control and protection all the
way down to the grass roots level.
21     For example, see M. Taylor Fravel, “Securing Borders: China’s Doctrine and Force Structure
for Frontier Defense,” Journal of Strategic Studies 130, nos. 4-5 (August-October 2007): 705-737.
22     The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces (Beijing: Information Office of the State
Council, April 2013), section on “Carrying out scenario-based exercises and drills”; Dennis J. Blasko,
The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge,
2012), 197-199.
23     The rings conception of Chinese security is drawn from Nathan and Scobell, China’s Search
for Security.
24     Other areas include the islands Beijing does not control in the East and South China Seas,
including Taiwan, the Senkaku/Diaoyutais, and the Spratlys/Nanshas, which are currently objects
of dispute with other claimants. While China has explicitly listed Taiwan as a core interest, Beijing
has demurred from officially placing these other islands in the same category.
25     For a fascinating account of this initiative penned by the commander of the Shenyang MR for
three years (2004-2007), see Chang Wanquan, “Huimou canyu Dongbe bianfang jianshe de sannian
[A Retrospective of three years participating in Northeast border defense building],” Jiefangjunbao,
January 7, 2009, 8. Of course, General Chang is currently the PRC’s Minister of National Defense
and concurrently a member of the Central Military Commission.
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A second ring of insecurity extends beyond China’s actual borders
and comprises adjacent peripheral areas to include all neighboring
countries and regions—continental or maritime. This area constitutes
a band or buffer within which Beijing seeks to maintain stable and
sympathetic—or at least neutral—regimes and deny presence or access
to the military forces of external powers. North Korea is perhaps the
most important of these regimes because of the extreme sensitivity
of the Korean Peninsula—its close proximity to China’s political and
economic heartland and Pyongyang’s status as barrier between Beijing
and Washington’s ally, Seoul, and the ROK-US allied forces south of
the Demilitarized Zone. According to General Wang Haidong of the
PLA’s China Institute for International Strategic Studies, while North
Korea’s value to China’s security is “very different to what it was during
the Korean War,” the country still has “special importance to China’s
national security and must be restored to its status as a strategic buffer.”26
In the mid-2000s, the PLA took over primary responsibility for border
defense duties along the boundary with North Korea. Starting in
February 2004, the PLA and KPA reportedly instituted regular border
defense conferences with their North Korean counterparts.27
Perhaps the most important point to make here is that, from Beijing’s
perspective, alarm over a North Korean contingency is fueled in large
part by fear of what US response this eventuality might produce or what
US action might precipitate.28 Since North Korea literally is situated
on China’s doorstep, not only could instability south of the Yalu River
radiate northward but also any military actions by the United States and
its ROK ally would send major shockwaves reverberating across China’s
threshold. This sensitive location is directly adjacent to China’s political and economic heartland. Indeed, the Chinese have long referred to
the relationship between Korea and China as “lips and teeth”—if the
Korean “lips” are removed then China’s “teeth” get cold and exposed
to the harsh elements.
In Beijing’s mind the prospect of instability in North Korea means
the disintegration of the barrier (i.e., the “lips”) and raises the specter
of US and ROK forces operating north of the DMZ. Also alarming
for Chinese leaders is the potential for a conflagration on the Korean
Peninsula which might escalate horizontally or vertically. Because of
these fears, one can logically infer that the PLA is planning for a North
Korean contingency. In fact, this planning focus has been the clear
message communicated by PLA analysts to the authors in recent years.
But which type of contingency is the PLA planning for?

Korean Contingencies PLA Style

As might be expected, PLA operational plans are not readily accessible. But we can draw on a selection of authoritative writings and
commentaries by Chinese military specialists on operational matters.
These sources can provide important insights about where, how, and
against whom the PLA expects to operate. Any PLA operations south
26     Wang Haidong, “Zhongguo you biyao jian zhanlue wending dai” [China must build strategic
buffers], Huanqiu Shibao on line, August 27, 2013.
27     Chang Wanquan, “Huimou canyu Dongbe bianfang jianshe de sannian [A Retrospective of
three years participating in Northeast border defense building],” Jiefangjunbao, January 7, 2009, 8.
28     Scobell, “The View from China,” 72.
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of the Yalu River will likely happen suddenly, almost certainly be unilateral, encompass a broad spectrum of missions, and anticipate the real
possibility of confrontation with the US military.

Suddenly Confronting a More Powerful Adversary

The precedent of China’s decision to intervene in the Korean
War in October 1950 remains indelibly etched in many Beijing minds.
Furthermore, the calculus behind the move—to prevent US forces from
stripping away the “lips”—still resonates six decades later. According to
authoritative Chinese military writings, the 21st Century PLA is preparing to face a more powerful adversary with overwhelming air superiority
and a size, configuration, and mix of capabilities that could only be the
armed forces of one country: the United States. Moreover, the location
could only be the Korean Peninsula. In 2005, for example, an article
appeared in a technical military journal written by four analysts from the
Zhengzhou Air Defense Academy. The team, based in the Jinan Military
Region (MR), analyzed the daunting “air threat” posed to a PLA group
army from an unidentified adversary in a notional “limited war” fought
“along our country’s land border.”29
Given Beijing’s heightened sensitivity to instability across the Yalu
and fear of spillover into the Shenyang MR, Chinese intervention could
come quickly (and quite possibly faster than any ROK/US intervention).
Thus, if North Korea implodes or erupts in civil war, Beijing will probably intervene earlier than either Seoul or Washington.
China will likely have at least some units of its armed forces poised
nearby and ready to go promptly. In the mid-1990s, the focus of maneuver exercises in the Shenyang MR shifted from hostilities with Russia
to “possible emergencies on the Korean Peninsula,” and training for a
North Korean contingency appears to have intensified since the mid2000s.30 Then, in December 2013 and January 2014, a series of major
exercises occurred in the Shenyang MR in the vicinity of China’s border
with North Korea, including one in which the number of participating
PLA personnel were reported to be as many as 100,000. While the PRC
Ministry of National Defense insisted that these were “normal training”
events, winter-time drills of this size and scope are highly unusual.31
One of the first units to intervene in a North Korean contingency
would likely be a light mechanized brigade from the 39th Group Army
equipped with wheeled fighting vehicles, but rapid reaction components,
including PLA Special Forces, helicopter units, and the PLA Air Force’s
15th Airborne Corps (located near Wuhan in the Guangzhou Military
Region) would be one of the first formations to arrive.32 However, full
29     Hao Qiang, Feng Lidong, Gong Xu, Yu Junsha, “Jituanjun fankong xi zhan yi kong zhong
weixie pinggu [Evaluation of air threat on group army’s anti-air raid campaign], Xiandai fangyu jishu
[Modern Defense Technology], 33, no. 1 (February 2005): 10-14, 18.
30     “Chinese Armed Forces Responding to Tensions on Korean Peninsula,” Kanwa Defense Review
no. 106 (August 1, 2013): 34-36.
31     “PLA mobilizes 100,000 troops for N Korean border exercise,” Want China Times, January 15,
2014, http://www/wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20140115000029&cid=1101;
“Shenyang Drills were ‘Regular Training’ MOD,” Global Times January 21, 2014, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/838579.shtml.
32     Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, 84, 104. Each military region has rapid reaction units (RRUs).
It is likely that RRUs from other MRs will participate in any North Korean intervention.
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mobilization of all the units in the Shenyang MR would probably take
weeks and deployment of units from other MRs would take even longer.
Beijing will want to prevent a flood of North Korean refugees
into China and seek to cordon off an area south of the Yalu River, and
perhaps even establish refugee camps. Beijing will likely also feel a sense
of urgency to seize control of North Korean nuclear and chemical sites,
especially those in close proximity to the Chinese border. These missions have all been identified as those types China’s armed forces should
be prepared to execute.33
Moreover, the PLA continues to maintain chemical defense units
both in active duty and reserve components. Shenyang is noteworthy as
the only one of seven military regions in China to possess both an active
duty chemical defense regiment and a reserve one.34 This dual capacity
is probably because of the MR’s proximity to North Korea—the most
likely location where the PLA will confront chemical weapons.
Chinese urgency will be driven in part by worries over “loose nukes”
and in part by a desire to preempt US action. China will assume the United
States would be extremely alarmed at the prospect of multiple unsecured
suspected weapons of mass destruction sites in North Korea, some quite
close to China’s border. Beijing’s logic is that a nuclear-armed North
Korea has prompted enormous US attention so it is highly likely that
the real prospect of unsecured WMD will trigger a swift US response.
The specter of US troops—even in relatively small numbers—anywhere
near the Yalu will be extremely disturbing to Beijing.35 While there is a
very good chance that China will seek a United Nations imprimatur on
any intervention in North Korea, this authorization is more likely to be
sought after the fact than beforehand.

Going It Alone

Despite this history of comradeship-in-arms, in the 21st century the
KPA and the PLA seem to act like allies at arm’s length.36 That is, there is
limited interaction and cooperation combined with a significant amount
of mutual suspicion and aloofness. There is a military-to-military relationship but this appears to be extremely modest. The manifestations
of the relationship appear largely ceremonial and superficial exchanges
of high-level delegations and a small number of KPA officers attending selected PLA professional military education institutions. However,
there do not appear to be any field or command post exercises between
the militaries of the kind one might expect between real or even nominal

33     Liu Xiangyang, Xu Sheng, Xiong Kaiping, and Zhong Chunyu, “Feizhanzheng junshi xingdong tanyao [An examination of MOOTW], Zhongguo junshi kexue (China Military Science), no. 3
(2008).
34     Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, 89-90.
35     Regular author conversations since 2002 with multiple military and civilian analysts in Beijing
and Shanghai.
36     Scobell, China and North Korea.

Challenges for Pacific Command

Scobell and Cozad

61

alliances.37 The most routinized and on-going series of bilateral or multilateral field exercises that the PLA conducts are under the auspices of
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with armed forces of member
states.38 By contrast, China’s security relationship with North Korea
seems strangely dormant.
Because of this condition, it is likely that any intervention by the
PLA in North Korea will be unilateral. There may be a veneer of cooperation with the KPA, but there will be nothing approaching the degree
of integrated command and control or level of interoperability that exists
between US Forces Korea and the Republic of Korea’s armed forces.
Moreover, one cannot assume there will be any level of cooperation with
the KPA in a PLA operation in North Korea. Indeed, it is conceivable
that the KPA might oppose Chinese intervention.

Combat and Noncombat Operations

The range of military operations the PLA will expect to conduct
span a wide spectrum from low-intensity combat, high-intensity kinetics
to noncombat operations dealing with nontraditional security threats.
For the past decade, the PLA has emphasized an expansive set of
noncombat, peacetime operations labeled “military operations other
than war” or “MOOTW” [ feizhanzheng junshi xingdong].39 Chinese military
doctrine has emphasized a set of four undertakings articulated by then
CMC Chair Hu Jintao in December 2004. He outlined four so-called
New Historic Missions which highlight a wide range of responsibilities
for the PLA: defending CCP rule, safeguarding economic development,
protecting national interests, and upholding world peace.
The PLA, of course, has not engaged in any significant combat
operations since the 1979 border war with Vietnam. Moreover, since
the 2008 election of Ma Ying-jeou as president of Taiwan, the likelihood
of crisis or conflict in the Taiwan Strait has been extremely low. With
high-intensity, large-scale combat a more distant proposition, in recent
years the PLA has turned more attention to dealing with an array of
nontraditional security threats confronting China. Outside of China, the
PLA sent more than 20,000 troops to participate in more than 20 United
Nations Peacekeeping or observer missions; dispatched more than 13
rotations of the three ship anti-piracy task force in the Gulf of Aden;
and in early 2011 elements of the PLA assisted in extricating more than
35,000 Chinese civilians from Libya in what China’s 2012 Defense White
Paper called “the largest overseas evacuation” in the history of the PRC.
37     On China-North Korea mil-mil relations, see Scobell, China and North Korea, 8-9. More recent scholarship on the PLA exchanges underscores the absence of robust mil-mil ties between
China and North Korea. See Heidi Holz and Kenneth Allen, “Military Exchanges with Chinese
Characteristics: The People’s Liberation Army Experience with Military Relations,” in The PLA at
Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, eds. Roy Kamphausen, David
Lai, and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute,
2010), 429-473. A recent analysis of the PLA multilateral exercises reveals no exercises with the
KPA; Blasko, The Chinese Army Today, 206-209.
38     Since 2002, China has conducted almost annual military field exercises with assorted SCO
member states. These have included not just the PLA and their counterpart armed forces but also
the People’s Armed Police and their foreign counterparts.
39     See, for example, Andrew Scobell, “Discourse in 3-D: The PLA’s Evolving Doctrine, Circa
2009,” in The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military, eds.
Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College
Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 99-134.
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In addition, PLA and People’s Armed Police formations regularly participate in counterterrorism exercises with a variety of countries, notably
with the member militaries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
Inside China, the PLA has engaged in humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief, including responding to the Sichuan earthquake in 2008,
snowstorms and other natural disasters. According to the 2012 White
Paper, hundreds of thousands of uniformed personnel were employed
in “emergency rescue and disaster relief activities” during 2008 alone.
The PLA seems to be planning for a range of nonwarfighting contingencies around its periphery. These include protecting the border,
stabilizing operations, dealing with refugees, controlling WMD
problems, protecting PRC citizens and property, and evacuating noncombatants. Indeed, according to an article coauthored by four officers
posted to the headquarters of the Shenyang MR that appeared in a 2008
issue of a prominent PLA journal, military operations other than war
include the following: “The defense of land, maritime, and air frontiers,
establishing restricted areas, soft battle strikes, military trade and aid,
peacekeeping operations, . . . controlling and managing refugees, . . .
[dealing with] nuclear, biological, and chemical agents, military control,
civil assistance, protecting and evacuating nationals in foreign trouble
spots . . . .”40
Beijing will almost certainly feel pressure to protect Chinese citizens
and economic interests in North Korea in the event of a crisis. Chinese
businesses now have significant economic investments in North Korea
and there are at least thousands of PRC citizens inside the country at
any given time.41
Despite attention to MOOTW, the PLA has not neglected combat
readiness and is also training for combat. In recent years, senior leaders
have been at pains to stress that while the PLA can perform a wide
range of “diversified military tasks,” its core mission remains preparing
to fight “local wars under conditions of informatization.” This focus
is what former commander-in-chief Hu Jintao and others have urged.
The implicit assumption is that such a war would be most likely to occur
at points around China’s periphery. Almost immediately after being
appointed to succeed Hu as chair of the CMC, Xi Jinping has stressed that
the PLA’s top priority should be “preparing for military struggle.”42 Some
have interpreted this statement to mean Xi was deliberately adopting a
bellicose stance and chalked this up as yet another indication of a more
assertive China. However, this rhetoric actually appears aimed at bolstering support within the military for its new commander-in-chief and
ensuring the PLA is prepared to execute its mission in Korea or elsewhere.

Conclusion

China’s previous rethink on North Korea policy occurred ten years
ago and turned out to be a recharge. The decision was determined by
Beijing’s vital interests: preventing domestic insecurity and maintaining
40     Liu Xiangyang et al., “Feizhanzheng junshi xingdong tanyao [An examination of MOOTW],
Zhongguo junshi kexue (China Military Science), no. 3 (2008), 4.
41     According to statistics from the PRC Ministry of Commerce, there are at least 5,000 Chinese
contract workers based in North Korea.
42     For example, see Cary Huang, “Xi Shaping up to be an influential PLA Commander,” South
China Morning Post, August 1, 2013.
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a stable buffer at the gateway to China’s political and economic heartland. Future Pyongyang provocations are unlikely to change Beijing’s
buffer strategy. China appears prepared to bolster the North Korean
buffer at all costs using every instrument at its disposal—economic
(aid, trade, and investment), political (tacitly supporting hereditary succession), diplomatic (refusing to condemn the North publicly for its
intransigence or transgressions and pursuing the Six Party Talks), and, if
necessary, military (including limited or wholesale intervention to prop
up the regime).
Indeed, all indications are that the PLA has been actively planning
for a variety of Korean contingencies. While China’s armed forces are
fully prepared to execute if so ordered, no one in Beijing is eager to
send Chinese forces across the Yalu for the second time in sixty years.
Unlike 1950, today Beijing has a sizeable tool kit of nonmilitary options
at its disposal where Pyongyang is concerned. Chinese leaders would
much prefer to manage the problem diplomatically and economically.
But this preference does not mean Beijing would hesitate to act militarily
if China’s vital national security interests were determined to be on the
line across the Yalu River.
For successive US administrations, cooperation and coordination
with China has been the cornerstone of their initiatives vis-à-vis North
Korea. But the above analysis suggests that Washington should alter its
expectations of what Beijing would be willing to do. Real, albeit modest,
diplomatic and economic coordination has occurred and may continue.
But military cooperation or coordination is another story. There has
been informal Track II discussion about possible coordination between
the US and PRC defense establishments concerning North Korea but
the topic is far too sensitive in China to move much beyond the realm of
the hypothetical. Despite this reality, persistent volatility on the Korean
Peninsula and high costs of miscommunication in a future North Korean
crisis require the United States to persevere in a dialog with China.
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